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Abstract
Although past research has suggested that pluralistic ignorance—a mismatch between
perceptions of others’ opinions and actual personal opinions—does not occur in every
circumstance, no studies have directly investigated variations among different attitude
objects. Drawing upon theoretical and analytical approaches based on social represen-
tations, this study examines differences between personal opinions and perceived
opinions of different groups toward same-sex female parenting (a newly debated at-
titude object) and working mothers (an older debated attitude object). Using data
from a study (N¼ 743) conducted in Switzerland, the findings indicate that pluralistic
ignorance occurs in opinions toward same-sex female parenting. Furthermore, the
findings show that pluralistic ignorance arises from false consensus among conserva-
tives and from false uniqueness among liberals.
One of the most common findings in social psychology and public opinion
research is the mismatch between perceptions of others’ opinions and actual
personal opinions, which is known as pluralistic ignorance (Eveland & Glynn,
2008). While some people, often conservatives, overestimate how widely their
own opinions are shared, others, often liberals, wrongly believe that their own
opinions differ greatly from those of others (Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014).
It has been suggested, though not empirically tested, that mismatches between
perceived others’ opinions and actual personal opinions do not occur in every
circumstance, as they ‘‘only hold sway over a society for a limited period of
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time’’ (Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2004, p. 350). Arguably, pluralistic ig-
norance is more likely to occur with debated attitude objects ‘‘by which the
individual isolates or may isolate himself in public’’ (Noelle-Neumann, 1983,
p. 141). Despite these suggestions, to our knowledge, no studies have directly
investigated the circumstances under which pluralistic ignorance is more likely
to occur. To adress this issue, we measure perceived opinions related to dif-
ferent reference groups (e.g., most people or most friends and relatives) and
personal opinions about new or older debates.
In the present research, we draw upon a social representation (SR) ap-
proach (Moscovici, 1976; Sammut, Andreouli, Gaskell, & Valsiner, 2015) to
classify individuals based on their social positioning (i.e., differences between
opinions and perceptions of different nested groups’ opinions) toward same-
sex female parenting (a newly debated attitude object) and working mothers
(an older and more agreed-upon attitude object). We consider that individuals’
opinions toward an object and their perceptions of others’ opinions are con-
tingent on a broader context in which representations have contextual, histor-
ical, and practical anchoring (Elejabarrieta, 1994). On this basis, we propose
that pluralistic ignorance is present mainly in newly debated objects.
Moreover, as opinions and perceptions are part of a social metasystem
linked to conflict and political agendas (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011),
conservatives and liberals may hold strategic positions regarding the future of
the debate. Therefore, we suggest that pluralistic ignorance might occur in a
specific normative window of time ‘‘where the prevailing norms are neither
entirely positive nor entirely negative toward the groups, but where there is a
general social change toward greater acceptance of the group’’ (Crandall &
Warner, 2005, p. 138).
Pluralistic Ignorance, False Consensus, and False Uniqueness
Since the first studies on students’ attitudes (Katz & Allport, 1931), the con-
cept of pluralistic ignorance has been supported for various ‘‘controversial’’
attitude objects, such as race (Fields & Schuman, 1976), drinking behavior
(Prentice & Miller, 1993), sexual minorities (Bowen & Bourgeois, 2001), or
sexual intercourse (Cohen & Shotland, 1996). Pluralistic ignorance has also
been shown to occur for various groups of reference, such as most people,
friends, or neighbors (e.g., Fields & Schuman, 1976; Glynn, 1989).
Pluralistic ignorance refers to a situation in which individuals perceive that
their opinion is shared by the minority when it is in fact shared by the
majority (Katz & Allport, 1931), or vice versa (Merton, 1968). In this article,
we endorse an expanded definition of pluralistic ignorance by focusing on the
perceived self-other distance. We focus on the perceived difference between
personal opinions and the opinions of others rather than the factual accuracy
of perceptions of others’ opinions.
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According to this expanded definition, pluralistic ignorance is a cognitive
bias that can have two directions (Eveland & Glynn, 2008; O’Gorman, 1988).
The first is false consensus, whereby one has the tendency to falsely consider
his or her opinion as commonly shared and alternative views as uncommon or
deviant (Eveland & Glynn, 2008; Miller & McFarland, 1987; Ross, Greene, &
House, 1977). The second is false uniqueness, whereby one has the tendency to
falsely consider his or her opinion as unique and not shared by others
(Bosveld, Koomen, van der Pligt, & Plaisier, 1995; Stern et al., 2014).
Two underlying mechanisms explain false consensus and—to a lesser
extent—false uniqueness. The first is a cognitive mechanism arising from a
lack of information to make people realize that their personal opinion is much
more/less shared than what they think. The second is a motivational mech-
anism arising from ego-defensive motivations through which people justify
their personal opinion (Gross & Miller, 1997; Marks & Miller, 1987;
Mullen & Hu, 1988; Wojcieszak, 2008; Wojcieszak & Price, 2009).
However, while both cognitive and motivational mechanisms may explain
false consensus and false uniqueness, they are so intertwined that it is difficult
to distinguish between them.
In the literature, false consensus and false uniqueness have been linked to
political values. Research indicates that conservative values are a predictor of
false consensus. People scoring high in conservative values showed greater
social projection regarding political attitudes (i.e., false consensus), which
was accounted for by a higher need for closure (Amit, Roccas, & Meidan,
2010). Moreover, European Americans scoring high in right-wing authoritar-
ianism and social dominance orientation were more likely to express false
consensus in evaluating opinions toward African Americans (Strube &
Rahimi, 2006). Several studies have shown that right-wing supporters tend
to express false consensus, especially when they see that support for their
opinion declines (e.g., Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015; Reid & Hogg, 2005).
In contrast, research indicates that the endorsement of liberal values is a
predictor of false uniqueness. In a study of Israeli voters, extreme left-wing
supporters had a tendency for false uniqueness, which might be explained by
their motivation to be perceived as a unique minority and distinct from con-
ventional right-wing voters (Babad & Yacobos, 1993). Moreover, liberals
tended to underestimate their similarity with other people due to their
desire to feel unique (Rabinowitz, Latella, Stern, & Jost, 2016; Stern, West,
& Schmitt, 2014).
Whereas the social and temporal contexts around the attitude object are
often implicitly considered in the justification for false consensus and false
uniqueness, the idea that the activation of false consensus and false uniqueness
among right-wing and left-wing supporters might vary for different objects
has, to our knowledge, never been tested. In this article, we rely on a SR
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approach (Sammut et al., 2015) to study the phenomena of pluralistic ignor-
ance, false consensus, and false uniqueness for attitude objects that differ in
their novelty in the public debate.
Toward a Social Representational Understanding of Pluralistic
Ignorance, False Consensus, and False Uniqueness
Social representations are ideas, thoughts, images, and knowledge that are
collectively shared (Moscovici, 1988, 1991; Sammut et al., 2015). They are
created when an object is newly inserted into the public sphere or becomes an
issue in a given context. In such situations, individuals tend to develop rep-
resentations of what other groups believe (Wagner, 1995) and position them-
selves toward these representations. This action is social positioning, which is
the ‘‘process by which people take up a position about a network of signifi-
cations’’ (Cle´mence, 2001, p. 83). More broadly, social positioning is the result
of the adaptation between what we think and what other groups think
(Cle´mence, 2001).
Social positioning may vary depending on the group to which people refer
when taking positions. In particular, the level of closeness to different groups
of reference might influence pluralistic ignorance. It is conceivable that people
perceive larger self-other disparities with general others (e.g., most people)
than with close others (e.g., friends). This finding is consistent with findings
from research on the ‘‘third-person effect,’’ which focuses on the perceived
impact of mass media messages: Self-other disparities tend to grow in mag-
nitude as the perceived social distance between self and others increases
(Perloff, 2009; see also the work on the spiral of silence, e.g., Hampton et
al., 2014).
Within the scope of an SR approach, false consensus and false uniqueness
can be considered to stem from different social positions reflecting the inter-
action between actual opinions and perceptions of other groups’ opinions.
Because these two positions are social in nature, they are likely to be influ-
enced by the social and temporal contexts around the object and, in particular,
its novelty in the public debate and its connection with specific political
strategies. First, the novelty of the debate might lead people to lack informa-
tion when picturing others’ opinions. For a novel issue, perceptions of others’
opinions might lag behind the changes in the actual climate of opinions. This
explanation is in line with the cognitive mechanism (Mullen & Hu, 1988;
Wojcieszak, 2008; Wojcieszak & Price, 2009). Second, political contentiousness
is likely to favor the polarization of false consensus and false uniqueness. For
conservatives, there is a motivation to demonstrate the normative legitimacy of
one’s position and a motivation to be different for liberals. This second ex-
planation is in line with the motivational mechanism (Mullen & Hu, 1988;
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Wojcieszak, 2008; Wojcieszak & Price, 2009). Hence, endorsing an SR ap-
proach to study false consensus and false uniqueness provides a tool to obtain
a better theoretical understanding of these effects.
Endorsing an SR approach is also meaningful from an analytical perspec-
tive. Within the SR field, a three-step analytical approach has been proposed
to explore social positioning as an articulation of the points of reference and
groups of individuals supporting different positions in the debate (Cle´mence,
2001; Elejabarrieta, 1994). The first step aims to identify the shared points of
reference (e.g., the perception of most people’s opinions). The next step is
focused on social positioning and aims to identify the association between the
opinions held by participants and the shared points of reference. This step can
be linked with the idea of identifying false consensus and false uniqueness.
The last step addresses the characteristics of individuals and groups to identify
the principles (e.g., political orientation) that organize these social positions.
This analytical approach rests upon factorial analyses, such as cluster analyses,
as they provide tools to classify individuals depending on their social position-
ing (Cle´mence, 2001).
In this article, we apply the SR analytical approach to study false consen-
sus and false uniqueness. This approach, particularly the application of cluster
analyses, allows for grouping individuals based on their answers. It also allows
for measuring consensus and uniqueness without reducing answers to the
different variables to a single indicator, as is usually done in studies of false
consensus and false uniqueness (e.g., Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015; Stern et al., 2014;
Strube & Rahimi, 2006). The added value of such an approach is that different
groups of reference and perceptions of their opinions can be considered along
with personal opinions. Moreover, it provides tools to account for false
consensus and false uniqueness among groups of respondents, particularly
conservatives and liberals.
The SR analytical approach allows us to show in this article that the
occurrence of pluralistic ignorance (i.e., false consensus, false uniqueness) is
likely to be highly dependent on the attitude object through its novelty in the
public debate and on the political strategies that it implies for conservatives
and liberals. To show this influence, we compare social positioning—regarding
different groups of reference—toward two attitude objects: same-sex female
parenting and working mothers.
Swiss Societal Background on Same-Sex Female Parenting and
Working Mothers
In the context of this study, same-sex female parenting and working mothers
have several similarities that make an examination of the pluralistic ignorance
phenomenon valuable. While both issues target mothers, their novelty in the
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public debate differs. This difference was documented in a March 2015
report on the modernization of family law released by the Swiss Federal
Council (Swiss Federal Council, 2015). This report was dedicated to describ-
ing past and present family dynamics through the evolution of the role of
women (e.g., increasing proportion of working mothers). It also addressed
future and current legal changes through a discussion of same-sex couples’
rights (e.g., the legal gap between Switzerland and several countries that
opened marriage and adoption to same-sex couples). This distinction be-
tween past and future changes highlights differences in the novelty in the
public debate, as much as the political strategies involved, for issues regard-
ing working mothers and same-sex (female) parenting.
While the number of working mothers with a preschool-age child
tripled between 1980 and 2017 and working mothers have switched from
being a minority to a majority in Switzerland (Giudici & Schumacher,
2017), issues around same-sex couples occupy a central position in the pol-
itical sphere. Same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption (with the exception
of stepchild adoption since 2018) are not legal in Switzerland. However,
same-sex marriage and adoption, as well as same-sex parenting, are currently
being debated in parliament. For example, a parliamentary initiative to open
marriage to same-sex couples was proposed in 2013 and is still being dis-
cussed in the Swiss government. The debate and legal issues around this
object—especially regarding what marriage for all would mean for same-sex
adoption and parenting—led the government to extend the discussions to
2019.
The differences in the social and temporal contexts around same-sex
(female) parenting (i.e., not legally allowed, jurisdictional discussions, new
debate) and working mothers (i.e., legally allowed, different laws, older
debate) are likely to lead to variations in social positioning. We expect to
find more occurrences of pluralistic ignorance for this ‘‘new’’ changing issue
because a polemical new process is involved in same-sex (female) parenting
(i.e., the opinion climate is not settled). Simply put, people may lack infor-
mation to identify the changes in the actual opinion climate. Moreover, as
same-sex (female) parenting is a more contentious issue than that of working
mothers, it is more likely to lead to the activation of ego-defensive/group
motivations, resulting in false consensus for conservatives and false uniqueness
for liberals.
To summarize, we formulated the following hypotheses. H1: Pluralistic
ignorance (i.e., a mismatch between the perceived majority/minority of others’
opinions and the actual minority/majority of personal opinions) is stronger for
same-sex female parenting than for working mothers. H2: Right-wing respondents
(conservatives) express a stronger false consensus toward same-sex female parenting
than working mothers; left-wing respondents (liberals) express a stronger false
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uniqueness toward same-sex female parenting than working mothers. In this study,
we also consider representations depending on groups of reference and their
level of closeness to each respondent (i.e., people, neighbors, friends, and
relatives). We will also explore the role of the level of closeness of the
group of reference because research has documented that people perceive
larger self-other disparities with general others than with close others (e.g.,
Hampton et al., 2014; Perloff, 2009).
Method
Participants and Procedure
Data were collected in the canton of Vaud in Switzerland in October 2016.
The canton of Vaud is geographically organized into 316 municipalities, which
are historically divided into politically progressive urban areas and politically
conservative rural areas (Ku¨bler, Scheuss, & Rochat, 2013). To reflect these
geographical cleavages, the study was based on a two-stage sampling method,1
with adult residents of municipalities within the canton of Vaud as the target
population. In the first stage, 30 municipalities within three geographical
categories of municipality—urban areas (NVaud ¼ 53), peri-urban areas
(NVaud ¼ 200), and rural areas (NVaud ¼ 65)—were selected. Within each
of these three categories, 10 municipalities were randomly selected. Within
each municipality, a minimum of two postal addresses were randomly selected
as starting points. During the second stage, residents of the 30 municipalities
were randomly selected using the random-route method. A questionnaire was
delivered to each selected household, and a maximum of 10 residents per
building were contacted. In each municipality, 80 self-administered paper-
based questionnaires (N¼ 2,400) and 40 contact letters with a link to a web
survey (N¼ 1,200) were distributed.
Of the 3,600 contacted people, 891 (37.3%) returned the paper-based
questionnaire, and 213 (17.8%) responded to the web version of the question-
naire. Due to missing cases (‘‘do not know’’ answers or nonresponses mainly
pertaining to questions about other people’s opinions), 361 participants were
excluded a priori. The final sample included 743 residents (320 men, 421
women, two unspecified; Mage ¼ 51.74 years, SD ¼ 15.81; 26.6% with a
university degree).2
1 The initial goal was to conduct a multilevel analysis to reflect differences among municipalities. The low
intraclass correlation (<.02) led us to ignore the hierarchical structure of the data.
2 In comparison to the population of the canton of Vaud in 2015 (STATVD, 2016), our sample is slightly
older (mean age in the canton of 47.7 years old), feminized (51.5% of the population is women), and
educated (21.4% have a university degree).
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Variables
Political orientation. Liberal-conservative orientation was measured with the
question, ‘‘On political issues, when people talk about right and left, where
would you place yourself?’’ The response scale was 1¼ far left, 2¼ left-wing,
3¼ center-left, 4¼ center, 5¼ center-right, 6¼ right-wing, and 7¼ far right
(M¼ 4.10, SD ¼ 1.18).
Personal opinion and perceived opinions toward same-sex female
parenting.3 Personal opinion toward same-sex female parenting was measured
with a single item: ‘‘To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a same-
sex female couple bringing up a child?’’ The response scale ranged from
1¼ strongly disapprove to 5¼ strongly approve (M¼ 3.00, SD ¼ 1.40).
Perceived opinions toward same-sex female parenting were measured by
asking each respondent: ‘‘How do you think most people (M¼ 2.06, SD ¼
0.81) [/most of your neighbors (M¼ 2.24, SD ¼ 0.92)] [/most of your friends
and relatives (M¼ 2.51, SD ¼ 1.32)] would react to a same-sex female couple
bringing up a child?’’.4 These items were adapted from the validated and
pretested European Social Survey (2006) items measuring perceived opinions.
Each time, the response scale was 1¼would openly disapprove, 2¼would dis-
approve without saying it, 3¼would not mind either way, 4¼would approve
without saying it, and 5¼would openly approve. An additional ‘‘I don’t
know’’ response, excluded from the analyses, was offered to the respondents.
Personal opinion and perceived opinions toward working mothers.
Personal opinion toward working mothers was measured by asking each re-
spondent, ‘‘To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a woman having a
full-time job while she has a child aged under 3?’’ (M¼ 3.04, SD ¼ 1.25).
Perceived opinions toward working mothers were measured by asking each
respondent, ‘‘How do you think most people (M¼ 2.59, SD ¼ 0.92) [/most of
your neighbors (M¼ 2.71, SD ¼ 0.98)] [/most of your friends and relatives
(M¼ 2.72, SD ¼ 1.36)] would react if a woman has full-time job while she has
a child aged under 3?’’ (also adapted from the European Social Survey, 2006).
The response categories for all the items were the same as those for same-sex
female parenting.
Control variables. Participant sex (1¼ female, 56.8%), age (in years,
M¼ 51.74, SD ¼ 15.81), university degree (1¼ having a university degree,
26.6%), level of religiosity (from 1¼ not at all religious to 5¼ completely reli-
gious; M¼ 2.89, SD ¼ 1.39), and geographic type of municipality of residence
(1¼ rural municipality, 32.5%) were included in the analyses.
3 We also measured opinions toward same-sex male parenting and same-sex marriage. To simplify the
comparison, these measures were not included in this article.
4 Respondents also had to answer for residents of the canton of Vaud. As the answers were almost the
same as those for ‘‘most people,’’ this item was not included in the analyses.
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Results
All the analyses presented below were conducted with R software (version
3.3.2).5
Differences in Pluralistic Ignorance
To test for pluralistic ignorance by comparing majority/minority perceptions
of others’ opinions with majority/minority actual personal opinions (H1), we
computed a percentage of disapproval score for personal opinions and the
mean percentage of respondents who perceived that others (people, neighbors,
friends, and relatives) disapproved. This procedure enabled us to directly
compare majority/minority perspectives, as is commonly done in studies of
pluralistic ignorance (e.g., Fields & Schuman, 1976). It also enabled us to
standardize the differences in terms of response categories for personal and
perceived opinions.
To compare same-sex female parenting and working mothers, we first
conducted two-sample t-tests comparing percentages of disapproval (or per-
ceived disapproval) for the two objects. Then, one-sample t-tests were con-
ducted to test, on one hand, whether a majority (more than 50%) or a
minority (less than 50%) of respondents disapproved and, on the other
hand, whether a majority or a minority of respondents perceived that the
majority of others (most people, most neighbors, most friends, and relatives)
disapproved.
First, as shown in Table 1, the percentages of actual disapproval did not
significantly differ between same-sex parenting and working mothers, t(742)
<1, p ¼ .660. A minority of respondents (38.4%) disapproved of same-sex
female parenting, and a minority of respondents (37.4%) also disapproved of
working mothers. Second, the percentages of perceived most people’s disap-
proval differed between same-sex female parenting and working mothers,
t(742) ¼ 12.07, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .16. A majority of respondents (77.7%)
perceived that most people would disapprove of same-sex female parenting,
5 The analyses were conducted on the reduced dataset. To control for the robustness of our results, we
imputed nonresponses using a multiple imputation procedure (10 imputed datasets). We do not report the
results based on the imputed dataset in the text due to clarity issues and limitations to pool the results of
complex analyses. The results between the imputed and restricted dataset were similar: a minority of
respondents (38.2%) disapproved of same-sex female parenting (disapproval significantly below 50%,
t(828) ¼ –6.97, p < .001), and a minority of respondents (37.7%) disapproved of working mothers (sig-
nificantly below 50%, t(828) ¼ –7.33, p < .001). A majority of respondents (78.6%) perceived that most
people would disapprove of same-sex female parenting (significantly above 50%, t(828) ¼ 20.15, p < .001),
and respondents (52.8%) were not a majority in perceiving that most people would disapprove of working
mothers (not significantly above 50%, t(828) ¼ 1.60, p ¼ .060). There was a significant three-way inter-
action among the object, the group of reference, and political orientation, F(3,2481) ¼ 17.64, p < .001, Zp2
¼ .02. Political orientation was a strong predictor of the probability of being in the FC cluster, OR ¼ 1.52,
95% CI [1.31, 1.76], p < .001.
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and neither a majority nor a minority of respondents (52.0%) perceived that
most people would disapprove of working mothers. Third, the percentages of
perceived most neighbors’ disapproval differed between same-sex female par-
enting and working mothers, t(742) ¼ 11.30, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .15. A majority
of respondents (69.3%) perceived that most of their neighbors would disap-
prove of same-sex female parenting, and a minority of respondents (45.5%)
perceived that most of their neighbors would disapprove of working mothers.
Finally, the percentages of perceived disapproval among most friends and
relatives differed between same-sex female parenting and working mothers,
t(742) ¼ 3.48, p ¼ .001, Zp2 ¼ .02. A majority of respondents (58.8%)
perceived that most of their friends and relatives would disapprove of same-
sex female parenting, and neither a majority nor a minority (51.5%) perceived
that most of their neighbors would disapprove of working mothers. In sum,
consistent with our first hypothesis, we observed that although both objects
were associated with the same level of disapproval, pluralistic ignorance was
found for same-sex female parenting only.
Finally, to explore the role of the level of closeness of the group of ref-
erence on self-other disparities, we conducted a two-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on the percentage scores with the group of reference and the object
as within-participant variables. We observed a significant two-way interaction
between the group of reference and the object, F(3,2226) ¼ 51.21, p < .001,
Zp
2 ¼ .06. In particular, the effect of the group of reference was stronger for
same-sex female parenting, F(3,2226) ¼ 151.82, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .17, than for
working mothers, F(3,2226) ¼ 21.33, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .03. In the case of
same-sex female parenting, personal opinions (38.4%) were more distant from
the opinion of general others (i.e., most people, 77.7% disapproval) than from
Table 1
Percentage of Disapproval Using One-Sided t-Tests for Comparison with 50%
Item Disapproval (%) 90% CI One-sided t-test
Same-sex female parenting
Personal opinion 38.4 [34.9, 41.9] –6.52
Most people’s opinion 77.7 [74.7, 80.7] 18.09
Most neighbors’ opinion 69.3 [66.0, 72.6] 11.41
Most friends’ and relatives’ opinion 58.8 [55.3, 62.4] 4.88
Working mothers
Personal opinion 37.4 [33.9, 40.9] –7.08
Most people’s opinion 52.0 [48.4, 55.6] 1.06
Most neighbors’ opinion 45.5 [41.9, 49.1] –2.47
Most friends’ and relatives’ opinion 51.5 [47.9, 55.1] <1
Note. CI ¼ confidence interval.
p < .001, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.
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the opinion of close others (i.e., most friends and relatives, 58.8% disap-
proval). This finding suggests that for this object, self-other disparities
increased as the level of closeness decreased.
Consensus and Uniqueness Among Different Political Orientations
In the previous section, we documented evidence of pluralistic ignorance for
same-sex female parenting and, hence, a false social knowledge of other
people. However, no evidence of pluralistic ignorance for working mothers
was found. With the following analyses, we further investigated the nature of
this false knowledge by testing for differences in expressions of false consensus
and false uniqueness among conservatives and liberals (H2).
Interaction between objects, group of reference, and political
orientation. To see whether differences among political orientation for the
two objects were likely to be found, we conducted three-way mixed measures
ANOVA with the group of reference and the object as within-participant
variables and political orientation (7-point scale) as a between-participant con-
tinuous variable.
The visual representation of mean differences among political orientation
is displayed in Figure 1. The results of the three-way ANOVA revealed a
significant three-way interaction between the object, the group of reference,
and political orientation, F(3,2223) ¼ 17.03, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .02. The inter-
action between the level of reference and political orientation was stronger for
same-sex female parenting, F(3,2223) ¼ 57.51, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .07, than for
working mothers, F(3,2223) ¼ 9.45, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .01. In the specific case
of same-sex female parenting, the analyses revealed that the effect of the group
of reference was stronger for liberal respondents (–1 SD), F(3,2223) ¼ 210.47,
p < .001, Zp
2 ¼ .22 (corresponding to a stronger differentiation between
personal and other opinions, i.e., false uniqueness) than for conservative re-
spondents (þ1 SD), F(3,2223) ¼ 17.9, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .02 (corresponding to
a weaker differentiation between personal and other opinions, i.e., false con-
sensus). In the specific case of working mothers, the analyses revealed that the
effect of the group of reference was weak for both liberal respondents,
F(3,2223) ¼ 37.81, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .05 and conservative respondents,
F(3,2223) ¼ 10.26, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .01.
These results show that the effect of political orientation differs between
same-sex female parenting and working mothers. The effects of political orien-
tation on personal opinions and perceived others’ opinions were stronger for
same-sex female parenting than for working mothers. These analyses also
showed that, in the case of same-sex female parenting, liberal respondents
differentiated more between their personal opinion and those of others.
To directly test for false consensus and uniqueness and, in particular, to
see whether these two social positions really structure answers at a theoretical
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level, we conducted cluster analyses by focusing on same-sex female parenting
(the more-debated object) only. Such an approach, based on SR, allowed for
controlling the existence of false consensus and false uniqueness without
inferring or creating a priori categories. It allowed us to directly test for the
effect of political orientation on these social positions and comprised a more
comprehensive and robust analysis.
Cluster analyses, false consensus, and false uniqueness. To compare
different cluster solutions and assess the reliability of our results, hierarchical
agglomerative cluster analyses were conducted on the four items for same-sex
female parenting. This procedure allowed us to compare different cluster so-
lutions (e.g., varying the number of clusters), as there is a hierarchy between
the clusters (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). The hierarchical cluster
analysis was performed using Ward’s method and the Euclidean distance
metric. We first identified the possible best number of clusters using the
NbClust package (Charrad, Ghazzali, Boiteau, & Niknafs, 2014) and then
reported the cluster solutions.
Based on the methods encoded in the R package NbClust (Charrad et al.,
2014), a two-cluster analysis was conducted. These two clusters classified
respondents based on their personal opinion and on their perceptions of
others’ opinions. Cluster 1 gathered 422 respondents who held a positive
personal opinion (M¼ 3.86), similar to their friends and relatives (M¼ 3.28)
but different from their neighbors (M¼ 2.64) and most people (M¼ 2.25).
Hence, this cluster could be named the false uniqueness (FU) cluster. In
contrast, Cluster 2 gathered 321 respondents with a negative personal opinion
(M¼ 1.87) who, in the same way, perceived that most of their friends and
Figure 1
Relationship between political orientation and approval scores for same-sex female parenting
(a) and working mothers (b)
Note. Error bars represent 95% CI. CI ¼ confidence interval
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relatives (M¼ 1.50), their neighbors (M¼ 1.70), and most people (M¼ 1.82)
held negative opinions. This cluster grouped people who did not differentiate
between their personal opinion and others’ opinions and could be conse-
quently named the false consensus (FC) cluster.
Because pluralistic ignorance was less documented for working mothers,
the positions should differ less on the basis of consensus and uniqueness. To
control for this expectation, we conducted a cluster analysis for working
mothers. As expected, the analysis was much less conclusive for working
mothers than for same-sex female parenting. A large majority of respondents
(74.3%) were grouped in a cluster in which perceptions and opinions only
differed to a small extent (see Supplementary Materials Annex SA for add-
itional analyses on working mothers).
Logistic regression to explain false consensus and false uniqueness.
From the results of the cluster analysis, a variable that assigned one cluster to
each respondent was created. To test the second hypothesis, a binomial logis-
tic regression was conducted to predict the probability of being in the FC
cluster instead of the FU cluster. The focal independent variable was political
orientation and the control variables were sex, age, university degree, level of
religiosity, and type of municipality of residence (see Table 2).
Confirming our second hypothesis, political orientation was a strong pre-
dictor of the probability of being in the FC cluster, odds ratio (OR) ¼ 1.50,
95% confidence interval (CI) [1.30, 1.73], p < .001. Level of religiosity was
also a strong predictor of being in the FC cluster (OR ¼ 1.31, 95% CI [1.16,
1.48], p < .001), and male respondents were 1.7 times more likely to be in the
FC cluster (OR ¼ 1.72, 95% CI [1.24, 2.39], p ¼ .001). The analyses were
also conducted on the clusters for working mothers, and no significant effect
of political orientation was found (see Supplementary Annex SB). This finding
Table 2
Logistic Regression Analyzing Likelihood of Being in the False Consensus Cluster Toward
Same-Sex Female Parenting
Odds ratio 95% CI
Intercept 0.04 [0.02, 0.10]
Sex (male) 1.72 [1.24, 2.39]
Age 1.01 [1.00, 1.02]
Level of education (university degree) 0.83 [0.57, 1.20]
Level of religiosity 1.31 [1.16, 1.48]
Geographic category (rural) 0.94 [0.67, 1.32]
Political orientation 1.50 [1.30, 1.73]
Note. CI ¼ confidence interval.
p <. 001, n¼ 706, Nagelkerke R2 ¼ .139, Accuracy ¼ 62.9%
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indicates that political orientation strongly influenced false consensus and false
uniqueness for same-sex female parenting only.
Discussion
This research is the first to formally work on attitude objects by examining
differences between personal opinions and perceived opinions toward same-sex
female parenting (current debated object) and working mothers (older debated
object). Furthermore, we proposed a new way of conceptualizing pluralistic
ignorance (false consensus and false uniqueness) among conservatives and
liberals through the endorsement of an SR approach to explore the processes
by which people categorize themselves through social positioning (Elcheroth et
al., 2011; Moscovici, 1991). The results discussed below indicate that (a) there
is evidence that pluralistic ignorance occurs for same-sex female parenting and
that this phenomenon might be due to the issue’s novelty in the public debate
(i.e., settled or unsettled issue) and (b) pluralistic ignorance arises from false
consensus among conservatives and from false uniqueness among liberals.
First, by showing that pluralistic ignorance was documented for opinions
toward same-sex female parenting (for all groups of reference) and not for
working mothers, we illustrated that the social and temporal contexts around
the object influence pluralistic ignorance. In line with our first hypothesis
(H1), we showed that a majority of respondents did not disapprove of
same-sex female parenting, while a majority of these respondents perceived
that most people/their neighbors/their friends and relatives disapproved. On
the other hand, this effect was not documented for working mothers, as a
majority did not perceive that most people/their neighbors/their friends and
relatives disapproved. Moreover, we showed that in a situation of pluralistic
ignorance, the distance between personal opinions and perceptions of others’
opinions was greater for more distant groups of reference. On the whole, our
findings might indicate that less debated and/or older objects, for which the
opinion climate is more settled, lead to less evidence of pluralistic ignorance.
Second, our analyses on social positioning toward same-sex female parent-
ing reveal that false consensus and false uniqueness explain pluralistic ignor-
ance. In line with the second hypothesis (H2), our results show that
conservative (right-wing) respondents almost never differentiate between
their personal opinion and their perception of others’ opinions. However,
liberal (left-wing) respondents differentiate a great deal between their personal
opinion and their perception of others’ opinions. These results corroborate
previous findings in the literature on false consensus (e.g., Amit et al., 2010;
Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015) and false uniqueness (e.g., Rabinowitz et al., 2016;
Stern et al., 2014). Furthermore, the comparison between opinions toward
same-sex female parenting and working mothers might also indicate that
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these effects are more likely to be found for newly debated objects that involve
political strategies for the future.
Beyond these findings, our research does not provide clear evidence to
distinguish the effects of the novelty of the debate (cognitive mechanism) from
the effects of the political strategies (motivational mechanism) around the
objects. To disentangle the effects of novelty and political strategies on false
consensus and false uniqueness, future research should consider adding a
measure of the perceived level of novelty of the debate and a measure of
political interest in the debate. Although the design of our study did not
provide us with tools to disentangle the effects, it is likely that both effects
influence pluralistic ignorance. Below, we discuss this question by expanding
the novelty of the debate to the idea of a time lag and expanding the level of
controversy to the idea of group conflicts.
Do Perceptions of Others’ Opinions Lag Behind Opinions for New
Debates?
Our first suggestion is that the evidence of pluralistic ignorance documented
in this study might come from the novelty of the debate around same-sex
female parenting. Perceptions of most people’s opinion toward same-sex
female parenting are very homogenous and negative. Indeed, even though
opinions vary, the perception of most people’s opinions reflects a stable con-
servative representation of most people’s opinions. Thus, these results show
the dynamic nature of representations. Some representations, especially when
they are shared, serve as a framework for the interpretation of new objects
(Sammut, Tsirogianni, & Wagoner, 2012). Within the SR approach, stable and
uniform representations are defined as hegemonic. Such representations are so
widely shared between the groups that they are implicit and often reified
through institutions (Moscovici, 1988). However, such hegemonic representa-
tions also ensure a form of primacy of the past over the present (Moscovici,
2000), suggesting the presence of a time lag. This idea of a time lag might be
an explanation, arising from a cognitive mechanism, for our results. We find
that opinions are polarized, but our results suggest that individuals do not
actualize their representations and still perceive others’ opinions as being
conservative.
Our observations are in accordance with studies on pluralistic ignorance
(e.g., Fields & Schuman, 1976; O’Gorman, 1988; Zou et al., 2009) that
showed that ‘‘a society’s perception of itself tends to lag behind actual
change in people’s private beliefs and values’’ (Zou et al., 2009, p. 581).
Furthermore, these findings have also been documented in new research on
norms (Tankard & Paluck, 2016, 2017) that explained the stability of the
perceptions by the fact that in times of social change, people may fail to
identify ongoing changes in opinions due to a lack of information. In the
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scope of our study, we could imagine that the institution’s position toward
same-sex couples is an important source of information to perceive others’
opinions, especially in Switzerland. Future research should examine the evo-
lution of perceptions and opinions across time or in an experimental setting.
Why Are Representations of Debated Objects So Stable?
The non-actualization of representations documented here may also be ac-
counted for by variables other than the temporal context. Group status and
conflict between groups might serve as additional explanations arising from a
motivational mechanism. Through the investigation of false consensus and
false uniqueness, we found that for same-sex female parenting, being male,
religious, and holding a right-wing political orientation are strong predictors of
the probability of being in the false consensus cluster. These groups have
historical specificities that may explain their presence in this cluster.
Historically, the native Swiss, the right, religious people, and males have
been dominant in the political system (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). Hence,
one can understand this presence of dominant groups that hold political
power in the false consensus cluster through the idea of the influence of
group status on representations. Indeed, SRs also have a historical dimension,
and they endorse the ‘‘power of the groups that embody the values that
underpin them’’ (Joffe & Staerkle´, 2007, p. 143). Therefore, the stability of
negative hegemonic representations might also be accounted for by the fact
that dominant groups endorse them (Staerkle´, Cle´mence, & Spini, 2011).
Limitations and Concluding Remarks
There are some limitations to the data and analyses that warrant discussion.
First, the comparison between same-sex female parenting and working
mothers might be limited, as we did not experimentally test for the effects
of debate or novelty on pluralistic ignorance. For this reason, we limited the
comparison to their legal frame of reference and their novelty in the public
debate. However, our results still indicate that pluralistic ignorance, false con-
sensus, and false uniqueness vary among objects. Moreover, the novelty of the
debate in addition to the political strategies involved with controversial debates
seem to account for these differences. Ideally, one should study the evolution
of social positioning across time for the same object.
Another limitation is related to the measures of perceived opinions, which
differ slightly from the measures of personal opinions. We decided to have
different measures of opinions for two main reasons. First, to enhance the
comparison while also using reliable and valid items, we used the measures of
perceived opinions proposed in the third round of the European Social Survey
(2006). Second, the response categories were chosen to facilitate respondents’
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cognitive process and, in particular, to allow us to access their ‘‘true’’ percep-
tion of others’ opinions. Measures that do not include expression are difficult
to interpret because one cannot differentiate between an opinion’s expression
and actual opinions (e.g., a respondent may believe that other people would
approve, given their expressions, and at the same time believe that they pri-
vately disapprove). We account for the fact that, although this formulation
further illuminates the phenomenon of consensus and uniqueness, the differ-
ence between the two measures might affect evidence of pluralistic ignorance.
Consequently, we standardized the data for the analyses of pluralistic ignor-
ance by comparing percentages of disapproval instead of the mean differences,
which allowed us to directly access majority/minority opinions.
A final limitation is related to the social desirability bias. This bias arises
when participants are asked questions about socially sensitive issues (Glynn,
1989), such as homosexuality (e.g., Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). In these situ-
ations, people are unwilling to report their ‘‘true’’ opinions, but they may
project them when reporting their perceptions of others’ opinions (Glynn,
1989). To minimize this bias, the questionnaire was presented as a study on
different family forms, and the topic of homosexuality was not salient because
only a few items touched on it. Moreover, the questionnaire was anonymous
and self-administered.
Despite the limitations mentioned above, we believe our findings have
normative and policy-making implications. In this specific normative window
of time (i.e., social change toward more equality; Crandall & Warner, 2005),
the perception that others hold negative opinions toward same-sex (female)
parenting might serve as an argument for both conservatives and liberals to
maintain or change the legal situation. Conservatives might argue against
legal changes toward greater recognition of same-sex parenting based on
the perceived consensus around their opinion within the population. For
liberals, the picture is less straightforward. On the one hand, based on the
perceived uniqueness of their opinion, liberals might strategically argue that
it is better to retain the law until opinions in the population shift toward a
greater acceptance of same-sex parenting. On the other hand, perceptions of
positive opinions among their friends and relatives might motivate them to
act for legal change. Thus, political parties and policy makers aiming to
convince liberals to act for legal change may have to take liberals’ feelings
of uniqueness into account, trying to adjust their misperceptions of others’
opinions.
To summarize, our method based on social positioning provided an ef-
fective way to congruently study false consensus and false uniqueness by
integrating as many variables and groups of reference as needed. We
showed that perceptions are not always accurate mirrors of personal opinions,
particularly when the object is new and/or debated in the political sphere.
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